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Optimal Control of Harm Reduction in Preventing HIV and Hepatitis C Among 
Drug Users 





 Blood-borne diseases pose the principal threat to the health of injection drug users 
(IDU). Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infections among IDU account for an 
estimated 25 percent of new HIV infections in the United States, a figure that does not 
include many cases attributed to sexual transmission involving injection drug users.1  
Hepatitis C (HCV), though less lethal than HIV, is far more widespread among 
IDU, with prevalence far above 50 percent in many populations.2-4 HCV among current 
and former drug users is now the most common diagnosis requiring liver transplantation 
in the United States.2, 5 A blood-borne agent spread through sharing of infected needles, 
cookers, cotton, and other injection equipment,3, 4, 6, 7   HCV is efficiently transmitted 
through infected needles. In one study, between 3 and 9 percent of hospital workers 
exposed to HCV through needle-sticking accidents subsequently contracted the virus.5 
For this reason, treatment and prevention interventions have proved less successful in 
slowing HCV infection than they have in slowing the spread of HIV.2, 3, 5, 8-11   
Harm reduction interventions, principally syringe exchange programs (SEP) and 
methadone maintenance treatment (MMT), are the principal levers available to 
policymakers in slowing infectious disease spread. Provision of sterile injection 
equipment through SEP is the paradigmatic example of harm reduction. Many SEP 
include components designed to reduce drug use. Even if these interventions have no 
impact on the frequency and duration of clients’ drug use, SEP seeks to reduce infectious 
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disease spread through provision of sterile syringes. Methadone treatment seeks explicitly 
to halt or reduce injection drug use and is a more intensive and costly intervention than 
syringe exchange.12 MMT interventions also include harm reduction elements, such as 
instruction in proper use of bleach or overdose risk.  
Many studies indicate that SEP can slow the spread of HIV among IDU.13-16  
Several studies indicate that MMT is also effective in slowing HIV spread.17-23  Both 
kinds of interventions appear markedly less successful in slowing HCV, even in 
populations that successfully maintain low HIV prevalence.2, 3, 5, 8-11  
Pollack (2001) presents an explicit epidemiological analysis that highlights the 
differing effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of SEP in addressing the two blood-borne 
epidemics.  This analysis, based upon the New Haven Needle Exchange Program, 
suggests that an imperfect intervention is highly effective in HIV prevention but has little 
impact on long-run prevalence of HCV.24 This analysis focused on steady-state 
comparisons and did not consider transient effects. Pollack (forthcoming) provides a 
more complex epidemiological analysis of MMT.23 Examining the cost-effectiveness of 
both kinds of intervention, this paper explores the average and marginal costs of MMT 
per averted infection. Although both analyses are intertemporal, program features are 
assumed constant over time.  
The current paper extends these analyses considerably by employing a dynamic 
optimization approach. In this framework the optimal level of methadone treatment is 
determined over time, depending on the size of the IDU population and the number of 
infected IDUs. As a result the number of “treatment slots” M need not be constant but 
might vary over the course of an epidemic. The optimal policy maximizes the net benefits 
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associated with treatment intervention. We show how it depends on parameters like 
infectivity rate (much higher for HCV than for HIV), the costs of intervention, the social 
costs of injection drug use and the costs associated positive serostatus for blood-borne 
disease. We find three principal results (hopefully we can extend this somewhat by 
pointing at differences in optimal policy between HCV and HIV): 
• M(t) should indeed vary over time in response to local conditions. 
Methadone treatment is less efficient if either the number of infected IDUs 
is low (indicating a low risk of infection for IDUs that are not infected 
(yet)) or when almost all IDUs are infected (not many uninfected IDUs left 
to which prevention is targeted).  
• Under realistic parameters, some level of intervention is cost-effective to 
prevent blood-borne disease, except when almost nobody or everybody is 
infected.   
• Disease eradication is not optimal within our model.  
 
II. Analytic Model 
 We start by presenting the dynamics in Pollack (2000). Table 1 (here we should 
argue why these parameter values are realistic) shows the definition of pertinent 
variables.  
If N(t) is the number of IDUs, it is given by the relationship 
)1()]()([)( ωδθ MtMtNtN −−−=  
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 Here θ is the exogenous inflow of drug users. M is the number of clients in the 
harm reduction intervention.[N(t)-M(t)]δ is the outflow of users not in treatment. Mω is 
the outflow of in-treatment IDUs.  
















 On the right-hand-side, the first term represents the exit rate of out-of-treatment 
IDUs. The middle term represents disease incidence among individuals who needle-share 
and do not participate in harm reduction interventions. The last term, µγ(I(M/N) (note 
WKDW HTXDOV FI7DEOH, represents the exit rate of in-treatment infected IDUs from 
the population. 
 In contrast to earlier work, we allow treatment slots to vary over time. M(t) is then 
chosen to maximize the present discounted value of the stream of benefits and costs 
associated with harm reduction intervention. This results in 
  )3()]()())(([min
0)( ∫
∞ − ++ dttNtItMge rt
tM
ρν  
 Here g(M) is the amount of money required to include M(t) people in treatment. 
Given “diminishing returns” in outreach to motivated IDUs and in service costs, we 
assume that g(;) is a convex function with g(0)=0, g’(M)>0, g”(M)>0.  
It makes sense that only IDUs will get methadone treatment so that 0 < M(t) < 
N(t). 
ν  is the annual social cost per infected user, and ρ represents the non-infection-
related social costs that accompany drug use. We set g(M)=a1M+a2M
2 to indicate the 
convex character of outreach and treatment costs as one enrolls less motivated or more 
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troubled clients into treatment interventions. [Perhaps ρ should be set to zero since our 
posited intervention does not alter N(t) when a=0. YES] 
The analysis of the “full model” that includes both states N and I is complex. In 
the present paper, we simplify matters by assuming that N(t) is constant, which 
corresponds to the case a=ω-δ=0 and N(t)= N*=θ/δ. This corresponds to the case that 




 Under the assumption µγ-δ=0, let us analyze the case that N(t) is constant at some 
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 Here π is the proportion of IDUs who are infected, and U is the proportion of 
IDUs who receive the intervention. In this case, the full model reduces to (in the formula 





















































variable, U. Over time, the decision-maker has to fix its control variable in such a way 
that the objective is optimized.  This should be done while taking into account the 
movement of the state variable, and the restrictions on the values of control and state. 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle (see, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)) provides 
conditions that a solution has to satisfy in order to be optimal. Applying the maximum 










































































The above analysis leads immediately to: 
Proposition 1. It is not optimal to eradicate the infection.  
Proof. (others must supply)  
Although calculations are complex, the intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. 
The payoff to treatment is extremely low when prevalence is low. Note that the number 
of new infections per unit time is  
]))1([])1([))(1()( 2 Ω−−Ω−=−Ω−=+= UNfUNfUNfN ππππδππι   
If the marginal cost of treatment is some positive c, the marginal cost per averted 

























 So it is never optimal to completely eradicate the infection through this 
kind of harm reduction intervention. This result has nothing to do with the defects of an 
available intervention. We assume that the posited intervention is perfectly effective in 
protecting participants against infectious disease transmission ZHFRXOGUHLQWURGXFHWKH 
into the model (see Pollack (Vienna conference paper)) and analyze the effects of having 
DOWKRXJK,GRQRWH[SHFWVSHFWDFXODUFKDQJHV. Since the marginal benefits of 
services are a quadratic function that goes to zero at zero prevalence, it is never cost-
effective to drive prevalence all the way to zero. 
Cost-effectiveness 
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 For infectious disease control, cost-effectiveness is an important concern. Given 
the optimal policy, one can then compute the cost of intervention per averted infection. In 
particular, suppose that ι0(t)} is the time-path of new infections per unit time absent 
intervention. In similar fashion, let {M(t), ι1(t)} be the time-paths of service provision 
and new infections per unit time under the optimal policy. Then the cost per averted 






















To illustrate qualitative results, can we simulate the following: All values 
corresponding to HCV with κ=0.03 (This is HCV, should we also do HIV?), a=0, 
δ=1/4000, ν=($10, $20, $50), a1=5, and a2=1.25e-6? Can we then compare these with 
M(t) set to a constant value to see how the payoffs and time-histories differ (This 
constant value should be that value of M that gives the highest objective value, given that 
M is not allowed to change over time). Here we should insert the graph that shows how 
M(t) behaves as function of time. The same for I(t). 
 
 
As shown in the example, the optimal allocation of harm reduction services varies 




 [Can we repeat the analysis with N=2000, g(M)=5M+0.0000025 (this should be 
0.00000125?) M2, and with the daily “cost” of infection $10, $25, and $50? Figure 1 
shows the phase diagram in the base case.]  
 [Phase diagrams] 
 Qualitative features:  
Applying standard control methods, the phase diagram depicted in Figure 1 is 
obtained. In the figure we see that treatment is large especially for intermediate values of 
the number of infected IDUs, and decreases to zero when this number is low or almost 
equal to N*. The intuition is that methadone treatment is ineffective when either the 
number of infected IDUs is low (i.e., relatively low risk of infection, since almost nobody 
is there to spread the disease), or when it approaches the size of the total IDU 
population. In the latter case most of the IDUs are already infected, so the number of 
potential new infections is low. Also, we see that in the longer term a steady state value 
for the number of infected IDUs and the number of treatment slots prevails.  (Here we 
must also present an (implicLWH[SUHVVLRQIRUWKHVWHDG\VWDWHYDOXHRI DQG8DQGFDUU\




In case we have nice results we should say something about differences HCV-HIV and 
mention the possible extension to analyze a population that suffers from both (See Jon’s 
Memo #38 (Sept 17, 2001)).  
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This paper explores optimal allocation of harm reduction services. In doing so, it also 
explores the cost-effectiveness of resulting interventions. It explores an idealized harm 
reduction intervention—one that eliminates disease risk for all program participants but 
that does not alter the underlying frequency or duration of injection drug use. It uses a 
random-mixing epidemiological model, and applies optimal control theory to derive the 
optimal path of services to maximize the net benefits associated with infectious disease 
control among injection drug users. Optimal control theory provides a useful tool to 
explicitly investigate the tradeoffs between protection and program cost. We also 
calculate traditional cost-effectiveness measures along the optimal time-path of the 
intervention. 
 We present numerical examples showing that the optimal trajectory of services 
significantly varies over time, in response to epidemic conditions. [compare the static and 
dynamic solutions; cost-effectiveness results] 
 In addition to simulation results, we demonstrate a central formal result: it is 
never optimal to eradicate blood-borne infection. Even as t ⇒ ∞, it is not optimal to 
approach zero prevalence in steady state. This result does not reflect posited faults of 
typical imperfect interventions. It applies to an idealized intervention that completely 
protects enrolled IDUs. At low sufficiently prevalence, the benefits of intervention do not 
justify the additional costs.  
[Do we know whether this is always true when a=0 for all values of b and f?] 
Eradication removes the need for further costly prevention interventions. Yet this payoff 
is not sufficient to justify the accompanying costs. 
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Like any formal analysis, this study includes important limitations. We use a 
random-mixing model most appropriate for populations with prevalent random sharing.  
This random mixing model can be extended to overlapping subgroups or more complex 
compartmental models. Segregated subgroups tend to depress disease incidence by 
reducing the proportion of “discordant” needle sharing that matches infected and 
uninfected IDUs. More sociologically complex models provide a more sophisticated 
framework to examine the context of needle-sharing and infectious disease spread.25, 26  
However, mathematical models indicate that the random mixing model provides a good 
approximation to non-random models when there is even a small degree of overlap across 
disparate sharing networks.27, 28  
Our analysis focuses on an idealized harm reduction intervention. We do not 
consider many other benefits associated with harm reduction interventions. Methadone 
maintenance treatment and best-practice syringe exchange include diverse components to 
shorten drug-using careers and to otherwise halt or to reduce individuals’ injection drug 
use.29 Including these benefits in the intervention would increase our estimates of 
program effectiveness and might also alter our analysis of optimal policy. 
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Variable/Parameter Empirical values Definition 
N(t) (Since a=0, this is θ/δ) IDU population 
M(t)  Number of treatment slots 
δ 1/(4000 days) Exit rate from active IDU 
population 
µ 1/(400 days) Exit rate from treatment 
θ 0.5/day Entry rate of new (uninfected) 
people into the IDU population 
γ .1 Permanent cure rate of treatment 
I(t)  Infected IDU population 
κ 0.005 for HIV 
0.03 for HCV 
Infectivity 
λ 1/(7 days) Frequency of needle-sharing 
Ω 0.3 Proportion of shooting gallery 
participants among treatment clients 
G(M) In example: 
5M+0.00000125M2 
Amount of money spent on 
treatment to put M people into a slot 
ν $10,20,50 Daily social cost per infected IDU 
ρ (Irrelevant since a=0.) Daily social cost per IDU 
independent of infection 
π I(t)/N The proportion of infected 
individuals--I/N 
U M/N The proportion of IDUs receiving 
the intervention—M/N 
A 0 µγ-δ The incremental increase in 
exit per “slot” from the IDU 
population due to the intervention. 
B  κλ 
F  κλ/Ω 
C $5 Cost/day 
ω=µγ 1/(4000 days) Exit rate from harm reduction 
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